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Abstract 
This paper explores whether ownership matters in a fundamental sense by comparing the 
performance of stockholder-owned firms with the much less analyzed nonprofit firms. No 
stakeholder has residual cash flow rights in nonprofit firms, and the control rights are held by 
customers, employees, and community citizens. Accounting for differences in size and risk and 
comparing only firms in the same industry, we find that stockholder-owned firms do not 
outperform nonprofit firms. This result is consistent with the notion that the monitoring 
function of stockholders may be successfully replaced by other mechanisms. We find evidence 
that product market competition may play this role as a substitute monitoring mechanism. 
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 1. Introduction 
The objective of the firm and the allocation of ownership rights among the firm’s stakeholders 
are two related issues that attract considerable public attention. A common view in the United 
Kingdom and the United States is that firms should maximize profits, and that residual 
claimants should hold all the ownership rights (Macey and O’Hara, 2003). In contrast, 
conventional wisdom in Continental Europe, Japan, and Scandinavia is that firms should have 
multiple goals and allocate ownership rights to more stakeholder types than just the residual 
claimants (Allen et al., 2011).  
 Our paper addresses these issues empirically by exploring whether the allocation of 
ownership rights (i.e., control rights and residual cash flow rights) among the stakeholders 
matters for the firm’s economic performance. We focus on nonprofits, which are firms where 
no stakeholder has both control (voting) rights and residual cash flow rights (Hansmann, 1996; 
Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001). Moreover, the diverse control structure of the nonprofits in our 
sample may make these firms operate under multiple objectives. This setting allows us to test 
the agency-inspired prediction that returns on capital invested in nonprofit firms will be lower 
than if the capital were invested in firms controlled by residual claimants (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). We find that this hypothesis is not supported by the data, we analyze the 
economic mechanisms that may be driving this result, and we conclude that a likely candidate 
is product market competition. 
The empirical literature on stakeholder structure and economic performance is quite 
limited. Rather than comparing the performance of nonprofits with the performance of firms 
with residual claimants, existing research has analyzed extensively whether cross-sectional 
differences in ownership structure correlate with differences in performance (Becht et al., 
2003). However, these studies compare only firms that have owners, that is, stakeholders who 
possess both components of the ownership right (Hansmann, 1996). Therefore, this literature 
leaves unanswered the more fundamental question of whether owners are critical in the first 
place. That question cannot be answered unless firms with owners are compared with firms 
that do not have owners.  
By definition, a nonprofit has no owners. This is because by regulation, none of the 
firm’s stakeholders can have both control rights and cash flow rights. Although called 
nonprofits, such firms can still earn a profit, but this profit cannot be distributed to stakeholders 
with control rights. Consequently, our empirical setting allows us to compare the economic 
performance of firms that have owners with the performance of firms that do not have owners. 
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Based on this difference in control structure, one would expect that profit-maximizing behavior 
is more likely among the owned firms than among the ownerless firms.1 
Understanding the governance qualities of nonprofits is also useful per se, because 
these firms play an important role in the economy. For instance, estimates from the United 
States in the 1990s show that nonprofits account for 64% of hospital care, 56% of day care for 
children, 20% of college and university education, and 10% of primary and secondary training 
(Hansmann, 1996, p. 227; Malani et al., 2003). In fact, contracting theory argues that the firm 
may not always be most efficiently controlled by its capital providers, but rather by other 
stakeholders like suppliers, customers, and employees. Such alternative allocations of control 
rights, including the case where no stakeholder has residual cash flow rights, are more efficient 
the stronger the firm’s market power over the stakeholder in question, the more firm-specific 
the stakeholder’s human capital, and the less symmetric the information between the 
contracting parties (Hansmann, 1996). To ensure a sufficient focus of the paper, however, we 
do not analyze why the observed organizational forms actually exist. Nevertheless, we do 
ensure a homogenous contracting environment by taking all sample firms from the same 
industry. Moreover, we try to control for potential endogeneity between performance and 
organizational form in the statistical tests. 
We use firm-level data from the population of Norwegian banks, which differ widely in 
terms of how cash flow rights and control rights are distributed among the stakeholders. One 
firm type is the standard stock company. These firms are commercial banks, where 
stockholders have all the cash flow rights, and where stockholders control the board by their 
voting rights. In contrast, ownerless (nonprofit) banks have no stakeholder with residual cash 
flow rights, and the control rights are shared by the employees, customers, and community 
citizens. That is, nobody can claim such a firm’s assets or cash flow once the fixed claimants 
have been paid off, and there is no equity owner around to discipline management. Finally, the 
sample contains a third firm type that is a mixture of the two pure types. All banks in our 
sample have equal access to the same, unsegmented product market and operate under the 
same regulatory regime. Hence, any two firms may choose to use the same technology, the 
                                                 
1 Empirical tests of stakeholders’ role in corporate governance have not focused on firms’ return on capital 
invested, but rather on firm behavior as reflected in productive efficiency, pricing strategy, risk taking, cost 
minimization, and transition between organizational forms (Malani et al., 2002). With few exceptions (Crespi et 
al., 2004; Ostergaard et al., 2009), the analyzed firms have at least one stakeholder with both cash flow rights and 
voting rights, such as equity investors in regular stock companies, depositors in savings and loan associations 
(S&Ls), policyholders in insurance mutuals, and producers in cooperatives. Thus, all these firm types have 
owners. 
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same product mix, and to be faced with the same demand curves. Regardless of what they 
choose, they are exposed to identical regulatory constraints. 
The power of our test is increased by this combination of high heterogeneity in 
stakeholder structure and low heterogeneity in contracting environment, market opportunities, 
and regulation. Suppose a necessary condition for economic success involves profit 
maximization as the behavioral norm and control by residual claimants as a governance 
mechanism. If such a relationship is true empirically, it should show up in the data as 
performance differences between firms that operate in the same environment, but that represent 
the largest possible difference regarding preferences and control rights among the stakeholders.  
Specifically, the agency logic suggests that compared to firms controlled by 
stockholders, firms controlled by multiple stakeholders without residual claims may have a 
double handicap in terms of producing high returns on capital. Our basic hypothesis is that 
ownerless banks produce lower returns on capital than do commercial banks. This happens 
because the ownerless bank lacks residual claimants who monitor management, and because a 
possible concern for non-owner stakeholders may be costly. Correspondingly, we predict that 
the performance of the hybrid bank, which is partly owned and partly ownerless, is somewhere 
in between the two pure types. As will be clear shortly, however, this basic hypothesis ignores 
several other potential determinants of performance, such as the banking supervisor and 
product market competition. We will gradually modify the basic hypothesis to account for this 
wider set of performance determinants.  
Our major finding is that owned banks do not outperform ownerless banks. Certainly, 
this result does not imply that stockholders produce no value beyond providing financing. 
However, our finding does suggest that the governance function of residual claimants may be 
successfully replaced by other mechanisms. That is, managers may be efficiently disciplined 
by substitutes for ownership. The three substitutes we consider are regulation, capital 
constraints, and product market competition. First, it may be argued that by overlooking all 
firms in our sample, the public banking supervisor has a monitoring function. However, the 
supervisor does not fill the governance role of stockholders. The supervisor’s job is to limit the 
downside risk and to ensure bank survival rather than to encourage the highest possible risk-
adjusted return.  
Second, one may argue that because ownerless banks cannot raise equity, this implicit 
capital constraint makes ownerless banks less prone to agency-induced overinvestment. We do 
not find empirical support for this explanation. Neither do we find convincing support for the 
somewhat related idea that just like managers of ownerless banks, managers of owned banks 
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are not monitored properly because the owned banks’ residual claimants have too weak 
incentives and too little power to control what the bank is doing. If this were the case, one 
would indeed expect owned banks and ownerless banks to have similar performance for 
governance reasons. 
The third potential substitute for the owners’ monitoring role is the need to perform in 
competitive environments. Purroy and Salas (2000) show theoretically that weak competition 
between profit maximizing and non-profit-maximizing firms may produce equilibria where the 
non-profit maximizer indeed earns the highest profit. Hence, lack of competition rather than 
differences in stakeholder structure may explain why ownerless banks are not outperformed by 
owned banks.  
However, it has been argued repeatedly and also shown theoretically that only efficient 
firms survive when competition is strong (Machlup, 1967; Schmidt, 1997). Giroud and Mueller 
(2010, 2011) have recently given empirical support to this idea in a corporate governance 
context. They show in their sample of stockholder-owned firms that monitoring by 
stockholders and competition in the product market are substitute governance mechanisms. In 
particular, the authors find that governance quality matters for operating efficiency only in 
non-competitive markets. 
In our setting, which is more general by also including firms without owners, the 
corresponding argument would be that competition disciplines a firm regardless of its 
stakeholder structure. Therefore, ownerless firms will persist in competitive markets only if 
they perform as well as owned firms do. By disciplining all firms, competition mitigates the 
governance handicap of ownerless firms by forcing them to let high returns to capital be the 
primary goal. We find support for this interpretation of our major result, using firm-level data 
on the relationship between returns on capital and local competitive pressure in the product 
market. 
We conclude that the observed relationship between stakeholder structure and 
economic performance is better understood when the agency logic is supplemented by the 
effect of market-wide discipline on firm behavior. This interpretation supports earlier findings 
that there is a serious challenger to the classic organizational form of enterprise that assigns 
every control right and cash flow right to the capital providers. The reason is that competitive 
markets may play the disciplining role in the absence of residual claimants.  
We think an interesting avenue of future research is to explore whether the relationship 
we have found between governance, competition, and performance is also valid in other 
countries than Norway and in other industries than banking. Such evidence may also reveal to 
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what extent the results we report in this paper depend on our use of backward-looking rather 
than forward-looking measures of performance and risk. 
Section 2 in the following describes the governance structure of the three firm types, 
and Section 3 presents the data set and key industry characteristics. We analyze performance in 
Sections 4 and 5, while Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Firm types and governance structures 
There are three firm types in our sample. The ownerless firms are pure savings banks 
(sparebank). These firms have no residual claimants, and they are controlled by their 
depositors, employees, and the local government. Hence, nobody can sell the firm’s assets and 
claim the proceeds, nobody can receive any dividend, the earnings are retained in full, and no 
new equity can be raised.2 Notice that these ownerless firms are not cooperatives, because 
cooperatives do have stakeholders with both residual claims and control rights, such as the 
customers in consumer-owned cooperatives, the employees in employee-owned cooperatives, 
and the producers in producer-owned cooperatives. Therefore, the ownerless banks in our 
sample have a fundamentally different governance structure than do the classic savings and 
loan associations (S&Ls), which are mutually owned consumer cooperatives.  
 The commercial banks (forretningsbank) in our sample are listed companies owned by 
their stockholders. The third firm type, which we call a PCC bank (grunnfondsbank), has 
voluntarily transformed itself from a pure savings bank (hereafter non-PCC bank) into a 
savings bank of the hybrid form. This transformation is made by issuing Primary Capital 
Certificates (hence PCC). These securities are regular equity shares with voting rights and 
residual cash flow rights, offering returns in terms of dividends and capital gains. Like equity 
securities in commercial banks, PCC securities are held by the general public and are normally 
listed. Thus, a PCC bank is partly ownerless, partly owned.3  
 Table 1 shows how control (voting) rights and residual cash flow rights are distributed 
among the four stakeholder types in the three firm types. The non-PCC bank has a committee 
of representatives with members appointed by the employees (25% of the votes), depositors 
(37.5%), and community citizens (37.5%). This committee elects the board, and the two bodies 
                                                 
2 The financial services act states that an ownerless bank which liquidates or merges must transfer its equity to an 
ownerless foundation. This capital can only be distributed locally as gifts for charitable purposes. Non-PCCs paid 
on average 4% of their earnings for social purposes during the sample period, while PCCs paid 1%. The 
corresponding figure for commercial banks is not available. 
3 The PCC security is not a debt-like security like preferred stock. Unlike preferred stock, a PCC security has full 
voting rights, pays no contractual dividend, and does not promise cumulative dividends. 
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jointly hire and fire the CEO. Because no stakeholder has residual cash flow rights, the non-
PCC banks are ownerless firms. 
 Commercial banks have stockholders who write the corporate charter and hold 73% of 
the votes for appointing directors.4 Stockholders have a 100% claim on the residual cash flow. 
Finally, the holders of PCC securities have 25% of the voting rights by law. These owners have 
a fractional claim on the residual cash flow that corresponds to their share of the book equity. 
This share varies between 5% and 92% across the sample.5 The remaining fraction of book 
equity is the ownerless equity. All three bank types have a two-tiered board structure, and 
decisions are made by simple majority in both tiers. 
 The first Norwegian ownerless savings bank was established in 1822, followed by the 
first stockholder-owned commercial bank in 1848. Regulation introduced in 1985 allowed for 
the first conversion by an ownerless savings bank (non-PCC) into a PCC bank in 1988. 
Currently, Germany (Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004), Norway, and Spain (Crespi et al., 2004) are 
the three European countries in which savings banks have a prevalent position in the economy, 
accounting for roughly half the banking assets. Only Norway and Spain have ownerless banks, 
while German savings banks are owned by local governments. Unlike in Norway, the founders 
of Spanish ownerless banks are on the board. PCC banks exist only in Norway, although recent 
regulation has opened up for PCCs in Spain. 
 Norwegian banks went through a systemic crisis in 1988–1992 (Moe et al., 2004). The 
first bank failure occurred in the fall of 1988, 13 small and medium-sized banks failed in 1988–
1990, and large commercial banks started failing towards the end of 1990. As government 
support of distressed banks sometimes required a full write-off of the existing equity, the three 
largest commercial banks came under full state ownership in 1992. The industry regained 
profitability in 1993, and the state quickly withdrew its involvement as an owner and 
emergency lender. The only exception is that of the largest commercial bank, where the state 
held a minority stake at the end of the sample period. 
 Although not an EU member, Norway has regulated its banks according to the Basel 
rules and the EU standards since the early 1990s (Moe et al., 2004). This means that the 
Norwegian banking industry has been exposed to standard regulation and typical levels of state 
                                                 
4 Limited liability firms with more than 200 employees are required by law to have one third of their directors 
elected by and among the employees. Industry regulation reduces this fraction of employee directors to 27% in 
commercial banks. All commercial banks in our sample have more than 200 employees. 
5 Bøhren et al. (2012) find that PCC banks use their dividend policy to mitigate potential conflicts of interest 
between the owners and the controlling non-owners. 
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ownership after the banking crisis ended. The only peculiarity is the system of three alternative 
organizational forms after 1985. 
 
3. Industry characteristics   
All banks in our sample have access to the same, unsegmented product markets throughout the 
sample period. There are no major regulatory barriers preventing the banks from entering each 
other’s product markets or geographical regions. The three bank types are subject to the same 
capital coverage constraints and reporting requirements. They must comply with the same 
accounting standard, and they are monitored by the same public banking inspector according to 
the same set of monitoring principles. Thus, neither the nature of their business nor the 
regulator’s monitoring effort suggests that the potential for consuming private benefits by non-
owner stakeholders differs across the three bank types. However, the agency logic predicts that 
because only the ownerless firms lack residual claimants, these firms will create less value. 
This happens because the non-owner stakeholders in control consume more private benefits by, 
for instance, expending less effort and by being more reluctant to lay off employees or reduce 
compensation. 
 Our data set includes every Norwegian savings bank (i.e., non-PCC and PCC) and 
listed commercial bank from 1985 to 2002. There are 2,668 firm years, of which non-PCCs, 
PCCs, and commercial banks account for 2,288, 214, and 166 observations, respectively. Panel 
(a) of Table 2 shows the average number of banks during the full sample period (1985–2002), 
the crisis period (1988–1992), and the post-crisis period (1993-2002). The number of all banks, 
commercial banks, and non-PCC banks drops over time, while the number of PCC banks 
increases. The decreasing number of commercial banks is due to acquisitions by domestic and 
foreign banks. Because there are only two listed commercial banks in 2002, we end the sample 
period that year. The number of non-PCC banks drops because of mergers among non-PCCs 
and transformations from non-PCC to PCC.6 
                                                 
6 Our sample period covers two consolidation waves for commercial banks. The number of commercial banks 
dropped around 1990 and once more just before 2000. In the first sub-period, which covers the systemic banking 
crisis, struggling banks were taken over by solvent banks. For instance, DnC, which was Norway’s largest bank at 
that time, merged with Bergen Bank, while Sunnmørsbanken and Sørlandsbanken were acquired by CBK, which 
was the country’s second largest bank. In the second sub-period, some banks merged into multinational financial 
groups. For instance, CBK merged into Nordea, which is a pan-Nordic financial conglomerate. Fokus was 
acquired by the Danish bank Danske Bank, and Bergens Skillingsbank was acquired by the Swedish bank 
Handelsbanken. Other banks were involved in domestic consolidations. For instance, Finansbanken was acquired 
by Storebrand, which is a Norwegian insurance company moving into banking at that time. There are currently 
three listed commercial banks. 
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 Panel (b) of Table 2 shows total bank assets across bank types. Savings banks as a 
group (i.e., PCCs and non-PCCs) gain market share over the sample period, although non-
PCCs gradually lose market share to PCCs. Aggregate PCC assets are just half the non-PCC 
assets in 1988, but almost three times bigger in 2002. This shift in relative size primarily 
happens because some large non-PCCs convert to PCCs. Descriptive statistics for size per bank 
are reported in panel (c). Every distribution reflects that each bank type includes a few 
unusually large banks. The median commercial bank is about five times larger than the median 
PCC bank, which is twelve times the size of the median non-PCC. This relationship suggests 
that controlling for differences in firm size is potentially important in empirical tests. 
Panel (d) of Table 3 shows that interest rates on deposits do not differ systematically 
between bank types. However, the average lending rate on home mortgages, which is the 
largest asset in every bank type, is lower in commercial banks every year except the first. Thus, 
the average interest rate margin is higher in stakeholder-controlled banks, reflecting a less 
aggressive pricing policy.  
Because non-PCC banks are not listed, we cannot use market prices to estimate risk 
measures like the stock return’s beta or volatility. Instead, we use accounting figures for all 
three bank types. Following Esty (1997a; 1997b), who uses accounting data to estimate risk, 
our basic risk measures are estimated from the balance sheet. In particular, we use the 
composition of the assets and liabilities to proxy for asset risk and liability risk, respectively. 
Panel (a) of Table 3 describes the asset structure across bank types. We divide the 
assets into seven categories and construct averages per category by value-weighting across 
banks per year and equally-weighting the annual averages across years. The riskiness of the 
assets is generally increasing from left to right in the table.7 Amortizable loans, which is the 
largest asset component in every bank type, are much more prevalent in savings banks than in 
commercial banks (75% vs. 49%). Short-term assets, which are the second largest asset 
component for every bank type, are slightly more common in commercial banks (21% vs. 
17%). Overall, these figures reflect that ownerless banks hold less risky assets than do other 
banks. 
                                                                                                                                                          
The savings bank industry consolidated more gradually and continued this process after the end of our 
sample period. There were 109 savings banks at the end of 2012, of which 27 were PCC banks. No new 
commercial bank has been listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange after 2002. However, the PCC bank SR-bank 
converted to a commercial bank and is now listed. 
7 Amortizable loans include long-term financing for specific assets and are usually backed by collateral. Examples 
are mortgages and financing of machinery. Such loans are usually less risky than Overdraft facilities and Building 
loans, where the bank’s exposure increases if the borrower faces financial distress. The category Other loans, 
which includes consumer loans like credit card financing, is the most risky asset class. 
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 We classify the liabilities into four categories. Liability risk is higher the more the bank 
is financed with debt and the more risky the components of the debt. This means that in panel 
(b) of Table 3, liability risk increases from left to right.8 The table shows that ownerless banks 
have more equity than do other banks.9 Also, the composition of the debt reflects a lower 
tendency by ownerless banks to take on risk. They rely much more on deposits (75% vs. 47%), 
use less subordinated debt, borrow less in the interbank market, and finance less from other 
debt sources. Thus, non-PCC banks fund their assets more by deposits and less by market 
borrowing than do commercial banks. PCC banks are roughly midway between the two.10   
 The relationship between stakeholder structure and bank behavior as documented in 
Tables 2 and 3 is generally consistent with the existing theory and empirics. For instance, Allen 
et al. (2011) show theoretically that if a firm starts internalizing its employees’ private layoff 
costs under financial distress, the firm will take on less risk, reduce size, and price its products 
less aggressively. Esty (1997b) finds empirically that when depositor-owned S&Ls in the 
United States convert to stockholder-owned commercial banks, they start taking on more risk. 
 In summary, the ownerless non-PCC banks are generally smaller and carry less risk 
than do banks that stockholders own either fully (commercial banks) or partially (PCC banks). 
The three bank types are subject to the same regulatory constraints, operate in the same 
unsegmented product markets, and are not protected by major barriers to entry. 
 
4. Stakeholders and performance 
Because there are no observable market values for non-PCC banks, we choose book return on 
assets (ROA) as our basic performance measure. ROA is operationalized as net income divided 
by the book value of assets. We use net income in the numerator because net income is after 
funding costs, that is, interest paid on liabilities. These funding costs are typically 75% of a 
bank’s total costs in our sample. Thus, using gross ROA (i.e., ROA based on income before 
                                                 
8 Deposits are insured by a fund collectively financed by the banks, and the government is a lender of last resort. 
Hence, there is no deposit risk for customers. As Due to banks and Other liabilities represent market funding, 
these liabilities are sensitive to interest rate movements and may also be more costly to roll over under adverse 
market conditions. Thus, banks relying more on market funding are generally more risky. 
9 Equity was about 7% for non-PCC banks and 3% for the other two types when the banking crisis ended. All 
bank types and particularly non-PCCs became permanently less leveraged afterwards. Regulation throughout the 
entire sample period stipulated that total liable capital must be at least 8% of the risk-weighted assets. This ratio 
may differ considerably from the one used in this paper, which must be based on unweighted assets. 
10 To check these relationships more formally, we estimate a multinomial logit model that predicts bank type from 
the bank’s size, growth, and balance sheet structure in any given year. The results, which are available upon 
request, support the impression from Table 3. For instance, over the period as a whole and also during the banking 
crisis, the probability that a randomly selected bank is a commercial bank rather than a non-PCC bank is 
significantly higher the more risky its liabilities as measured by our risk proxies. 
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funding costs) would ignore the major driver of a bank’s competitive cost advantage, which is 
its funding ability. Also, income before funding costs is completely dominated by the bank’s 
interest income. This fact means that gross ROA will move in tandem with the general level of 
interest rates, regardless of the bank’s ability to create returns on capital invested.  
 Neither of these distortions applies to the (net) ROA measure we use, which is also a 
common performance measure in the banking literature (e.g., Esty, 1997a; 1997b; Berger et al., 
2000; Crespi et al., 2004). Nevertheless, we will use alternative performance measures in the 
robustness tests. Notice that because our ROA is net income divided by total assets, it will 
produce lower return figures than gross ROA. For this reason, our performance measure cannot 
be meaningfully compared with standard benchmarks like the riskless rate or the return on the 
market portfolio. 
 Table 4 shows the average ROA across bank types and time periods. Ownerless banks 
have the highest performance over the period as a whole, being 0.88% in non-PCC banks, 
0.41% in PCC banks, and 0.32% in commercial banks, respectively.11 The statistical 
significance of these performance differences is much weaker after the banking crisis (1993–
2002) than during the crisis (1988–1992). In particular, average performance does not differ 
systematically between the owned commercial banks and ownerless non-PCC banks outside 
the crisis, and commercial banks were most negatively hit by the crisis. The latter observation 
is not surprising, given our earlier finding that commercial banks pursue more risky strategies. 
This higher risk-taking makes their performance move more in tandem with overall market 
movements. Hence, commercial banks will perform worse than other banks when the overall 
banking market drops. 
Thus, as expected, ownerless banks do better relative to other banks the weaker the 
general market conditions. The more surprising feature in Table 4 is that at least according to 
the raw ROA figures, ownerless banks are on average not outperformed by partially or fully 
owned banks in more normal times. However, the bank types differ in many other respects than 
their organizational form, and some of these characteristics may matter for performance. In 
order to validly test our basic hypothesis, we must account for more determinants of relative 
performance than just bank type. 
                                                 
11 Non-PCCs have higher ROA than do commercial banks in 15 of the 18 sample years, and PCCs are 
considerably closer to commercial banks than to non-PCCs (not shown in the table). 
A study of governance activity in Spanish banks during a similar period finds slightly higher average ROA in 
ownerless savings banks (1.28%) than in stockholder-owned commercial banks (1.13%) (Crespi et al., 2004, 
Table 2). 
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4.1 The base case 
Because we have repeated observations for the same firm over time, we use a random-effects 
approach to account for unobserved firm effects on performance. Using firm fixed effects is 
infeasible, because we must include a dummy variable for bank type (Hsiao, 2003). We use 
year dummies to capture unobserved industry effects on the performance of the whole banking 
sector. The robustness tests will explore what happens when we ignore these unobservable firm 
and industry effects. We estimate the model separately for the full sample period (1985–2002), 
the banking crisis period (1988–1992), and for the post-crisis period (1993–2002).  
The base-case model is estimated in Table 5. PCC and Com are the two key variables in 
the model. Both are dummy variables that equal 1 if the bank is of the said type and 0 
otherwise. Thus, both dummy variables are zero for a non-PCC bank. The agency logic 
predicts that the two dummy variables have positive coefficients, and that the commercial bank 
coefficient is the more positive of the two.  
As for control variables, we follow the logic from Table 3 and proxy for asset risk by 
the ratio 1- ((cash + amortizable loans + fixed assets) / total assets). Correspondingly, we proxy 
for liability risk by the ratio 1- (due to customers/total assets). Although we must use 
accounting returns rather than market returns, we expect that risk and return are positively 
related also in an accounting sense. Thus, we predict positive coefficients for the two risk 
proxies.  
Because of ambiguous evidence on the relationship between profitability and bank size  
(Berger and Humphrey, 1994; Hughes et al., 2001), we do not predict the sign for the size 
coefficient. Notice, however, that the size proxy may also account for the alternative 
explanation that although ownerless banks have a governance handicap, this drawback is 
mitigated by the benefit of being small in an industry where large firms are less profitable per 
unit invested. This logic predicts a negative coefficient for the size proxy and positive 
coefficients for the two bank dummies.  
 According to the first column of results, which shows the estimates for the full sample 
period, the model explains 31% of the variation in ROA, and the model is highly significant. 
After having accounted for differences in risk and size, the estimates show that a non-PCC 
bank is expected to outperform a PCC bank by 0.18 ROA units and a commercial bank by 0.77 
units. The riskiness of the assets and the liabilities are both positively related to returns, and 
profitability decreases with firm size. All these findings are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
 - 13 - 
The second column of results estimates the basic model over the crisis years. Every 
sign from the first column is maintained, and both the economic and the statistical significance 
increase except for asset risk. Thus, what holds for the full sample period is even more 
pronounced in the systemic crisis. This finding supports the notion that the lower risk of non-
PCC banks makes these banks do better than other banks in market downturns. 
The rightmost column shows that the result for the full period is driven by the 
exceptional crisis years. Although the coefficients of the bank-type dummies keep their 
negative sign, their numerical values are much closer to zero. The commercial bank dummy is 
no longer significantly different from zero, and the PCC dummy is significant only at 9%. 
Thus, there is no obvious performance difference between bank types after the crisis.12   
The control variable for size reflects that profitability decreases with bank size in the 
crisis period and increases afterwards. This pattern is as expected, given our finding that the 
ownerless banks, which tend to be small, are doing considerably better than are other bank 
types only during the crisis. Finally, performance relates positively to risk according to both 
risk proxies in every period, except for liability risk after the crisis. 
The remarkable result in Table 5 is that owned banks do not outperform ownerless 
banks in normal times. This relationship may reflect that the governance of ownerless firms is 
not inferior to the governance of owned firms. We next analyze the robustness of the base-case 
result, while Section 5 explores potential substitutes for the governance role of residual 
claimants in ownerless firms. Because our primary interest is the relationship between 
organizational form and performance in normal times, we place most attention on the ten years 
of the post-crisis period. 
4.2 Robustness 
We analyze the robustness of the base-case results by using sized-matched samples, by 
measuring risk and performance in alternative ways, and by controlling for possible 
endogenous choice of organizational form.13  
                                                 
12 Three pairs of independent variables are quite strongly correlated. This characteristic applies to firm size and 
liability risk (0.68), to firm size and the commercial bank dummy (0.48), and to liability risk and the commercial 
bank dummy (0.52). Nevertheless, Table 5 shows that the individual coefficients for these variables are almost 
always significantly different from zero. 
13 We have also analyzed how the estimates depend on the econometric technique used to handle the panel 
structure. In particular, we first ignore unobservable performance effects at the firm level by considering only 
time-varying fixed effects for the banking industry. Next, we ignore both features. The estimates show that if we 
just run OLS on the pooled sample without any control for unobservable effects, the coefficients are biased, and 
the adjusted R2 drops by almost 90 percent for the full period and by roughly 65 percent in the two sub-periods. 
The unobservable characteristic that matters for overall model fit is the industry effect rather than the firm effect. 
Nevertheless, only the base-case model in Table 5, which accounts for the joint influence of unobservable industry 
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The base-case results may be influenced by the fact that most non-PCCs are small 
compared to PCCs and commercial banks. For instance, Table 2 shows that the median 
commercial bank is sixty times larger than the median non-PCC bank. Although our base-case 
model does control for size, the fact that the typical size is so different across bank types may 
create a sample heterogeneity that is not properly handled by the simple, proportional size 
control in the base case. To handle size heterogeneity better, we construct a matching sample 
where size is more homogeneous across bank types. The matched sample contains only non-
PCC banks that are larger than the smallest commercial bank. Moreover, we keep at least as 
many non-PCC banks as commercial banks in the sample. These restrictions reduce sample 
size by roughly 80%, to 473 firm years, of which 185, 127, and 161 are for non-PCCs, PCCs, 
and commercial banks, respectively. The median size of a commercial bank in this sample is 
3.4 times the median non-PCC, compared to 60 in the base case. 
Table 6 re-estimates the base-case model using the size-matched sample. The estimates 
show that the main results persist, although several performance determinants have weaker 
statistical significance in these much smaller samples. Importantly, however, the relative 
performance of ownerless banks becomes even stronger than in the base case.  
This robustness to how we account for size also suggests that the base-case result is not 
driven by possibly higher margins in the product markets chosen by smaller, ownerless banks. 
We may address this margin question more directly, however, which is also a way of 
controlling for a possible customer preference for local banking services. Specifically, we 
account for differences in market-driven profit opportunities by adding the bank’s interest rate 
margin as a new independent variable in the base-case model. In unreported regressions, which 
are available upon request, we find that the interest rate margin is not positively related to the 
bank’s performance. Importantly, however, accounting for the interest margin does nothing 
substantial to any other relationship, including the role of bank type. This finding is 
inconsistent with the notion that the performance effect of being small, which often involves 
being ownerless in our sample, is driven by higher margins in these small firms’ primary 
product markets. Along the same lines, notice also that the base-case model in Table 5 shows 
that profitability increases with firm size in the post-crisis period. Nevertheless, once size is 
controlled for, there is no significant performance effect of being owned vs. ownerless in this 
period. 
                                                                                                                                                          
effects and firm effects, produces a non-significant performance difference between ownerless banks and 
commercial banks in the post-crisis (normal) period. 
 - 15 - 
 Measuring risk is particularly challenging in our study. Having non-listed banks in the 
sample precludes the use of market values, the book value of assets and liabilities may 
correlate poorly with fundamental risk characteristics, and we can use only annual observations 
made during rather short time periods. Nevertheless, one alternative is to measure risk by the 
volatility of ROA. Therefore, we have estimated risk in year t as the standard deviation of the 
bank’s ROA from (t-1) to (t+1).14 Unreported results show that although the relationship 
between bank type and performance from Table 5 is generally upheld, the economic and 
statistical significance drops, non-PCCs differ less from PCCs, and the relationship between 
risk and return becomes negative.  
We think this result may be due to a data problem that comes on top of those stemming 
from annual book values over short time periods. The structural relationship between ROA and 
ROA volatility is unstable over time in our sample. In particular, ROA volatility is very high 
and ROA is very low during the crisis. Thus, even if we had a longer time series, we might not 
have been able to improve the precision of the risk estimates by extending the estimation 
window beyond three years. For these reasons, we put more trust in the risk measures from the 
balance sheet as used in the base-case model. 
 More fundamentally, there is little reason to expect that any adjustment for risk would 
invalidate our major finding. Table 4 shows that non-PCCs do not have significantly lower 
average returns than do the two other bank types in any year. Moreover, the balance sheet 
characteristics in Table 3 suggest that regardless of how we measure risk based on assets and 
liabilities, non-PCCs would not be more risky than the other banks are. In fact, unreported 
regressions show that if we modify the base-case model in Table 5 by assuming that non-PCC 
banks are as risky as the other banks, the base-case result from Table 5 persists. 
The next robustness test replaces ROA by alternatively measuring performance by the 
ROE (return on equity) and the ROS (return on sales or profit margin). Table 7 shows the 
findings, where the only difference from the base case is that commercial banks do better after 
the crisis than the two other types. As discussed earlier, however, we think the ROA used in 
the base-case is a more suitable performance measure for banks. Unlike the ROE, the ROA 
reflects the ability to manage the most important cost component, which is funding costs. 
Moreover, the ROA does not move in tandem with market interest rates.15 Finally, although the 
                                                 
14 Just as we found using risk measures from the balance sheet in Table 3, ROA volatility is highest in commercial 
banks and lowest in non-PCC banks. ROA volatility peaks around the banking crisis for all bank types. 
15 The ROE is also technically problematic in our context because its denominator is periodically very low and 
even negative during the crisis years. This property produces very volatile and sometimes meaningless ROE 
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ROS may ideally be a proxy for market power (Lerner, 1934), this measure does not relate the 
profit to the assets invested to obtain the profit, but rather to the revenues produced by the 
assets.  
So far, we have ignored any endogeneity caused by the possibility that poorly 
performing non-PCCs may have converted to PCCs to raise new equity. In fact, Ostergaard et 
al. (2009) find that high leverage is the strongest predictor of conversion from non-PCC to 
PCC. Ignoring this possibility may bias our results towards overestimating the relative 
performance of non-PCCs. Hence, we have re-estimated the base-case model by first pooling 
non-PCCs and PCCs into one group. Subsequently, we exclude all PCCs and also the non-
PCCs that later convert to PCC. These two robustness tests, which are available upon request, 
produce no material changes to the base-case results from Table 5. 
 
5. Alternative explanations  
Our major finding so far is that performance is not higher in owned firms than in ownerless 
firms under normal market conditions. This is a puzzling result from an agency perspective. 
Certainly, controlling stakeholders in ownerless firms have incentives to ensure the firm’s 
survival. This is because only a surviving firm can provide them with future control benefits, 
such as below-market product prices paid by customers, inflated wages paid to employees, and 
sponsoring of community projects. However, and as a direct consequence of such private 
benefits of control, stakeholders of ownerless firms lack the incentive to maximize risk-
adjusted returns on capital invested. The reason is that these returns are higher the larger the 
residual cash flow, that is, the smaller the pecuniary benefits going to controlling stakeholders 
alone. 
 We will analyze two reasons why our major finding may nevertheless be plausible from 
an economic viewpoint. First, suppose stockholders of owned firms are forced to be passive for 
exogenous reasons, such as regulation. If that happens, the key governance mechanism from 
agency theory will not be allowed to operate in owned firms. Hence, owned firms would have 
the same governance handicap as ownerless firms, and we would expect no performance 
differences. 
 Second, any firm may be disciplined by other and even more powerful governance 
mechanisms than the owners’ monitoring activity. In that case, control by residual claimants 
                                                                                                                                                          
figures. For instance, average ROE in commercial banks is –152% in 1991 and 18% in 1997, and one commercial 
bank had equity of NOK –11.5 billion in 1989. 
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may not be critical to ensure that the firm performs well. We will also analyze the role of such 
potential owner substitutes. 
 
5.1 Restrictions on ownership  
Are owners of commercial banks able to execute their control rights in a value-creating way? If 
not, commercial banks would be like ownerless banks in the sense that the residual claimants 
are not monitoring. Governance research has found that firms’ performance tends to improve 
when ownership rights are held directly by persons rather than indirectly through 
intermediaries, and when some owners have sufficiently strong incentives and power to 
monitor (Becht et al., 2003).  
Applying this logic to our sample, Table 8 reports the aggregate equity fraction per 
owner type in panel (a) and the fraction held by the largest owner and the five largest owners in 
panel (b). Panel (a) shows that the average direct (personal) ownership is about 50% in a PCC 
bank and 20% in a commercial bank. The corresponding figure in Norwegian non-banks is 
18% during a similar period (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2006). This high incidence of direct 
ownership in our sample firms suggests that being ownerless is more of a governance handicap 
in banking than in other industries. This feature increases the power of our test. 
 The opposite impression is given by panel (b), which shows that ownership 
concentration in banks is considerably below the typical ownership level in Norwegian 
industry, which is about 30% for the largest owner and 55% for the five largest owners as a 
group (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2006). The low ownership concentration in banking is due to 
regulation, which mandates permission from the Ministry of Finance for any investor or 
coalition of investors to own more than 10% of a bank’s stock.16 Because this cap is binding 
for the median commercial bank in our sample, the regulatory constraint on ownership 
concentration reduces the power of our test.  
 Nevertheless, a 10% ownership stake represents no trivial amount in terms of inherent 
monitoring incentives. For instance, 10% of the equity in the largest and smallest commercial 
bank in 2002 was NOK 2.5 billion and NOK 0.2 billion, respectively. Thus, although 
regulation forces ownership concentration below the optimum level, the restriction does not 
destroy the potential for active monitoring by the owners of PCCs and commercial banks.  
 
                                                 
16 The mean ownership concentration exceeds this median because the state held very large stakes in a few banks 
around the banking crisis and also held 47.8% of the equity in the largest commercial bank at the end of the 
sample period.  
 - 18 - 
5.2 Substitutes for the governance role of ownership 
Pressure from owners on management may not be critical for firms’ performance if other 
governance mechanisms function at comparable costs. We consider three such substitutes for 
the owners’ monitoring function: (i) regulators in all firms, (ii) capital constraints in ownerless 
firms, and (iii) competition in all firms.  
 The public banking supervisor monitors according to the same rules in every bank, 
regardless of the bank’s stakeholder structure. Thus, it may be argued that high-quality banking 
supervision plays the governance role of residual claimants. If it does, the regulator may make 
owners redundant in owned firms and hence heal the governance handicap of ownerless firms. 
The problem with this argument is, however, that the banking supervisor’s job is not to 
maximize the risk-adjusted return of bank assets. Rather, the primary job is to limit downside 
risk.17 Therefore, the existence of a public supervisor may explain why depositors are willing 
to leave their money with commercial banks and PCCs, whose owners may benefit from 
excessive risk-taking at the depositors’ expense (Hansmann, 1996). In addition, the existence 
of banking supervisors may explain why most banks survive. But such supervision cannot 
explain why a given bank or bank type is more profitable than another type. This argument is 
supported by a study of 244 banks in 44 countries (Caprio et al., 2003). The authors find no 
clear relationship between a bank’s value and the way the bank is controlled by the banking 
supervisor.  
 The second potential substitute for residual claimants is based on the fact that by 
construction, non-PCC banks cannot raise new equity. Thus, whereas owned banks can equity-
finance overinvestment with both earnings and proceeds from stock issues, ownerless banks 
can use only earnings. This implicit financial constraint may discipline managers of ownerless 
banks in similar ways that active owners discipline managers of owned banks. Were this to 
happen, it would force overinvesting ownerless banks to finance growth more heavily with 
debt than do other banks. Therefore, the agency logic predicts that ownerless banks will have 
higher leverage and be closer to the regulatory maximum. Moreover, this tendency would be 
particularly strong whenever the industry were growing fast. The start of our sample period 
coincides with the beginning of a deregulation regime that gave banks more flexibility, 
including the ability to compete on interest rates (Moe et al., 2004). We would therefore expect 
                                                 
17 The Norwegian Financial Services Authority states that its main purpose is “to ensure that financial enterprises 
and markets function securely and efficiently in the best interest of society and users of financial services…” 
(Kredittilsynet, 2002).  
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overinvesting non-PCC banks to be more equity constrained than other banks under such 
market conditions.  
 Table 9 does not support this conjecture. The average equity capitalization ratio is 9.8% 
in non-PCCs and 7.1% in commercial banks. The former is significantly larger than the latter 
in 15 of the 18 sample years, and the maximum ratio in any year is normally more than twice 
as large in non-PCCs.18 Consequently, ownerless banks are further away from the minimum 
equity requirement than are owned banks. This finding suggests that the inability to raise new 
equity does not discipline ownerless banks in ways that substitute well for owner monitoring.19 
Competition is our third candidate to substitute for ownership. The general idea is that 
greater competition reduces admissible inefficiency in any enterprise, regardless of its 
organizational form. This argument means that when competition is soft, actively monitoring 
owners are necessary to ensure high managerial effort. However, the firm may still survive if 
such owner qualities are missing, provided the firm has sufficient market power. In contrast, 
firms facing strong competition will fail under low managerial effort, regardless of whether the 
owners are strong, weak, or nonexistent. Thus, market pressure and the agents’ incentives to 
expend effort to protect their human capital jointly create the urge to perform. This logic makes 
performance independent of monitoring quality under strong competition, while performance 
and monitoring quality are related positively when competition is soft.  
The very limited empirical literature supports this logic. Palmer (1973) was among the 
first to find that ownership structure and performance correlate more strongly the greater the 
firm’s market power. Giroud and Mueller (2010) analyze what happens to firms when takeover 
threats become smaller after the passage of antitakeover laws at the state level in the United 
States. The authors find that in industries with strong product market competition, neither the 
firm’s market value nor its operating performance changes systematically. In contrast, firms in 
non-competitive industries experience abnormally low stock returns and operating 
performance. Similarly, a related study finds that firms in non-competitive industries benefit 
                                                 
18 The legal minimum ratio is based on a weighting system across the asset classes. Because we cannot reconstruct 
this weighting exactly, we use unweighted assets, defining the capital coverage ratio as equity plus subordinated 
debt divided by assets. The upward shift in capitalization in 1992 and 1993 coincides with the end of the banking 
crisis and the implementation of the Basel Accord. Equity capitalization is highest in all three bank types around 
1995, moving slowly downwards thereafter. 
19 Notice also that although the free cash flow of a non-PCC bank is automatically reduced by the inability to raise 
equity, the opposite effect comes from the fact that all the bank’s earnings are retained. Easterbrook (1984) argues 
that dividend payout and the resulting need to issue stock for investments purposes is a powerful governance 
mechanism. Hence, the non-PCC bank is disciplined neither by the cash drain from dividend payments nor by the 
scrutiny of the capital market in equity issues. Nevertheless, it seems that this lack of discipline does not induce 
overinvestment. 
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more from improved governance quality than do similar firms in competitive industries 
(Giroud and Mueller, 2011). 
The potential sources of competitive pressure in our setting are the product market, the 
labor market, and the market for corporate control. Pressure from the market for corporate 
control cannot explain our findings, because ownerless firms cannot be traded. Labor market 
competition is probably rather weak in general, because overall unemployment is only 4.2% on 
average and never exceeds 6.0% in the sample period.20 However, the demand for managerial 
talent may still be modest in smaller communities. Thus, savings bank employees in particular 
may be disciplined by potential loss of human capital when the bank is underperforming.  
Product market competition is the stronger candidate for rationalizing our results. We 
have already pointed out that all banks in the sample have access to the same product market, 
and that there are no major economic or regulatory barriers to entry. Moreover, the Norwegian 
banking market is reasonably competitive by international standards.21 However, this is at best 
only indirect evidence. To fully test the competition hypothesis, one would need at least two 
industries with both owned firms and ownerless firms, and where competition is strong in one 
industry and weak in the other. According to the competition logic, owned firms would 
outperform ownerless firms only in the non-competitive industry.   
Our empirical setting does not allow for such an ideal test. Instead, we choose a related 
approach by analyzing whether a bank’s local competitive environment influences its 
performance relative to the performance of other banks.22  We measure competition for a given 
bank in a given municipality in two alternative ways. One measure is called Branch 
competition, which is the number of bank branches owned by other banks than the bank in 
question. The second alternative is called Bank competition, which is the number of other 
unique banks. We compute these measures per 10,000 inhabitants and average them over the 
                                                 
20 Source: Statistics Norway. 
21 Data for the period 1990–2002 show that market concentration in Norwegian banking is at the medium level 
among 16 European countries and consistently lower than elsewhere in Scandinavia. Source: Central Bank of 
Norway. 
22 Omitted variables like local barriers to entry may influence both the competitive environment and the bank’s 
performance. We ignore this possible endogeneity by treating the bank’s market share as exogenous. Hence, we 
limit ourselves to analyzing how the given local competition drives the relationship between bank type and 
performance. Our rationale is that although the decision to enter a local market may depend on barriers to entry, 
these barriers may not differ systematically from one municipality to another. The banking regulation is national 
and hence identical across municipalities. The resources needed to establish a bank of a given size do not differ 
markedly from one municipality to another. These characteristics suggest that the potential endogeneity is rather 
constant across municipalities. Hence, our approach may not be biased, because we estimate the link between 
differences in competition and differences in the relationship between bank type and performance. 
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municipalities in which the bank is operating.23 Hence, the two competition measures reflect 
the competitive pressure the bank is faced with from all other banks in its environment. 
Panel (a) of Table 10 shows distributional properties of the two competition measures 
across the three bank types. On average, non-PCC banks tend to face the strongest competition. 
For instance, non-PCC banks compete with 1.51 other banks per municipality per 10,000 
inhabitants on average, while commercial banks compete with 1.04 other banks. The difference 
between the corresponding medians is considerably smaller, however, and non-PCC banks face 
much more heterogeneous competition than do the two other bank types. For instance, the 
standard deviation for Bank competition equals the mean for non-PCCs, but is only about half 
the mean for the two other bank types. Moreover, the number of competing banks has a 
maximum of 10.87 and a minimum of 0 for non-PCCs, while the corresponding figures for 
commercial banks are 2.61 and 0.55, respectively.  
Panel (b) converts each continuous competition variable from panel (a) into three 
discrete levels of competitive intensity (low, medium, and high) and shows the percentage of 
banks of a given type at each level. Like in panel (a), the general impression is that non-PCCs 
tend to face stronger competition on average than the two other bank types. For instance, 
whereas 36% of the non-PCC banks face strong competition according to the Bank competition 
measure, 9% of the commercial banks do so. On the other hand, the percentage of them facing 
low competition is quite similar across the two bank types, being 35% and 38%, respectively. 
Therefore, like the average values of the continuous competition measures in panel (a), the 
discrete levels of competitive intensity blur the heterogeneity in the sample. 
In order to account for the effect of product market competition on bank performance, 
we augment the base-case model from Table 5 by the two firm-specific competition proxies 
from Table 10, which we also interact with the bank type. The findings are reported in Table 
11. For the sample period as a whole, three features emerge that are consistent with the 
competition logic. First, the bank type dummies are no longer significant determinants of 
performance differences across bank types. Thus, the type of stakeholder control is irrelevant 
for relative performance once competitive pressure from the product market is accounted for. 
This result supports the idea that competition is a stronger disciplining device than is the 
allocation of cash flow rights and control rights across the stakeholders. Second, the interaction 
term between competition and bank type is negative and significant for commercial banks. 
                                                 
23 We are grateful to Charlotte Ostergaard, Ibolya Schindele, and Bent Vale, who generously made their hand-
collected data set on bank industry competition available to us. Among the six competition measures used in their 
paper (Ostergaard et al., 2009), we report our findings for the two measures that produce the cleanest results. The 
findings for the four other measures are available upon request. 
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Hence, greater competition reduces the importance of the stakeholder structure as a 
determinant of relative performance. This result is consistent with the logic that stronger 
competitive pressure forces the firm to focus on profits regardless of the firm’s stakeholder 
structure. 
Third, the insignificant competition dummies suggest that competition per se does not 
materially affect the level of performance. Thus, our finding in Table 10 that non-PCC banks 
face stronger competition on average does not imply that performance will necessarily be 
higher or lower than in the other bank types. This result is consistent with the theoretical result 
that the net effect of competition on performance levels is ambiguous (Schmidt, 1997). The 
logic is that, certainly, greater competition produces stronger incentives for agents to work 
harder. This happens because greater competition reduces profits by pushing prices down, 
which increases liquidation risk and reduces the value of agents’ firm-specific investments. 
However, lower product prices also erode the value of agents’ cost-reduction efforts. These 
two opposing effects will not necessarily make it optimal for principals to induce more effort 
and higher efficiency from agents when competition becomes stronger. Correspondingly, 
weaker competition does not imply higher profits in our setting. Moreover, we cannot tell 
whether the leveling effect of competition on performance in our sample as documented by 
Table 11 works primarily through less market power or higher efficiency. 
The relationship between competition and performance is stronger statistically and 
economically during the banking crisis than in the full period. Finally, like in the full period, 
the stakeholder structure is irrelevant in the post-crisis period. The interaction terms are not 
significant. 
 These findings are consistent with the notion that product market competition matters 
for the relationship between performance and firms’ stakeholder structure. This evidence is in 
line with recent findings from a setting that does not involve ownerless firms, but where the 
monitoring quality provided by stockholders varies cross-sectionally (Giroud and Mueller, 
2010; 2011). Our results are also consistent with findings for ownerless Danish firms 
(Thomsen and Rose, 2004). Although the authors do not consider product market competition, 
they do find that ownerless foundations with majority stakes in listed Danish firms do not 
realize lower returns than other investors. 
Overall, it seems that among the alternative reasons we have analyzed for why 
ownerless firms are not underperforming relative to owned firms, product market competition 
receives the strongest support from the data. Given this evidence, one may wonder what 
remains of the classic arguments for organizing banks as ownerless firms (Hansmann, 1996). 
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Although this question of optimal organizational form is outside the scope of this paper, our 
findings may still shed some light on the answer. Unlike in earlier periods, it does not seem 
true anymore that customers (i.e., borrowers and lenders) of ownerless banks would face 
excessive contracting costs as customers in commercial banks. In addition, they do not have 
particularly homogenous preferences as a group, they do not lack regulatory protection against 
moral hazard through excessive risk-taking by commercial bank owners, and the ownerless 
banks in our sample are not so small that agency problems are irrelevant. Nevertheless, our 
findings do not support the argument that because ownerless firms retain all their earnings and 
are immune to the market for corporate control, they represent the only firm type in our sample 
that can survive long after having lost their competitive advantage as an organizational form 
(Hansmann, 1996, p. 262). If this were a valid explanation, banks organized as nonprofits 
would have had the weakest performance, which is not what we find. Rather, it seems that once 
one accounts for the effect of competition, organizational form becomes, at best, of secondary 
importance. 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
Financial economists tend to take for granted that closer monitoring by stockholders will 
improve firms’ economic performance. Moreover, we seldom question the conventional 
wisdom that stockholders will lose if they internalize the welfare effects of their actions on 
other stakeholders, such as customers and employees. Our paper challenges these ideas by 
analyzing empirically whether the absence of controlling stakeholders with residual cash flow 
rights matter for firms’ performance.  
 We compare the returns on capital invested of firms organized as nonprofits (i.e., 
ownerless firms, where no stakeholder has both control rights and residual cashflow rights) 
with the returns of firms owned by stockholders. Ownerless firms are fundamentally different 
in a governance sense from owned firms like cooperatives and mutuals, where customers, 
employees, or suppliers hold both the residual cash flow rights and the control rights. Our 
setting allows us to address the question of whether firms can be economically successful 
without owners rather than addressing the more limited question of whether ownership 
structure matters for firms already organized as owned enterprises. 
Our major finding does not support the idea that economic performance is greater the 
stronger the capital providers’ ownership rights. After having accounted for differences in risk, 
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size, and unobservable firm and industry effects, we find that ownerless firms are not 
outperformed by firms owned fully or partially by stockholders. 
Economic theory would argue, however, that regardless of stakeholder structure, 
managers of firms with potential agency problems can be disciplined through other channels 
than monitoring by residual claimants. For the nonprofit firms in our sample, we find that 
product market competition may indeed play such a substitute role. This interpretation is 
supported by similar findings reported from settings that do not involve nonprofits, but where 
the monitoring quality provided by stockholders varies across firms. We conclude that once 
one accounts for the disciplining effect of product market competition on firm behavior, 
organizational form becomes a less important determinant of economic performance.  
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Table 1: The distribution of control rights and cash flow rights across stakeholders
Residual cash
Bank type Stockholders Employees Depositors Community flow rights, %
Non-PCC 0 25 37.5 37.5 Nobody
PCC 25 25 25 25 Stockholders: 5–92
Commercial 73 27 0 0 Stockholders: 100
Control rights, % 
This table shows the distribution of control (voting) rights and residual cash flow rights across four
stakeholders (Stockholders, Employees, Depositors, and Community) in non-PCC banks, PCC banks,
and commercial banks during the sample period 1985–2002. Non-PCC banks are ownerless. PCC banks
have issued equity securities to the general public in the form of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). The
remaining equity in PCC banks is ownerless. Commercial banks are regular stock companies owned by
their stockholders.
Time All Commercial
period banks banks All Non-PCC PCC Listed PCC
1985–2002 152 9 142 131 14 11
1988–1992 155 12 143 137 7 3
1993–2002 137 6 131 113 18 16
Time All Commercial
period banks banks All Non-PCC PCC
1985–2002 931 524 406 186 265
1988–1992 891 555 336 187 149
1993–2002 991 527 464 141 323
All Commercial
banks banks All Non-PCC PCC
Mean 5.4 78.3 2.5 1.4 20.2
Std 22.6 98.0 9.9 3.2 33.9
Median 0.7 43.5 0.7 0.7 7.9
Min 0.03 10.2 0.03 0.03 0.50
Max 238.7 238.7 125.7 28.6 134.6
Savings Commercial Savings Commercial Savings Commercial
banks banks banks banks banks banks
10.42 10.04 4.78 4.81 5.64 5.23
(c): Size per bank
Savings banks
Table 2: Industry characteristics
(a): Number of banks
Savings banks
(b): Aggregate size per bank type
Savings banks
Panel (a) shows the total number of Norwegian banks (All banks), the number of listed commercial banks,
savings banks (Non-PCC banks and PCC banks), and listed PCC banks. Panel (b) shows aggregate total assets
per bank type. Panel (c) shows the mean value of total assets during the sample period for an individual bank,
its standard deviation (Std), the median, minimum (Min), and maximum (Max). Panel (d) reports the average
interest rate in percent from 1992 to 2002 on home mortgages and on ordinary deposits. The interest rate
margin is the difference between the interest rates on home mortgages and ordinary deposits. Source: Central
Bank of Norway. 
The figures in panels (b) and (c) are in billions of NOK as of year 2002. The sample includes all non-PCC
banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial banks. PCC banks have issued equity securities to the general public
in the form of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). The remaining equity in PCC banks is ownerless. Non-PCC
banks are ownerless. Commercial banks are regular stock companies that are owned by their stockholders.
(d): Interest rates
Home mortgages Ordinary deposits Interest rate margin
Bank type Fixed assets
Amortizable 
loans
Short-term 
assets
Overdraft 
facilities Building loans Other loans Losses
Non-PCC 2.3 73.1 17.6 5.8 2.8 0.3 -2.0
PCC 2.8 74.6 16.0 6.2 2.6 0.0 -2.2
Commercial 3.2 49.1 21.3 7.9 2.0 18.9 -2.4
Bank type Equity
Subordinated 
debt
Due to 
customers Due to banks Other liabilities
Non-PCC 8.6 0.3 75.0 9.5 6.6
PCC 5.3 3.0 63.0 13.6 15.2
Commercial 5.0 3.2 47.0 18.9 25.8
Table 3: Balance sheet structure
This table shows aggregate balance sheet characteristics across the three bank types. Non-PCC banks are ownerless. PCC banks have issued equity
securities to the general public in the form of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). The remaining equity in PCC banks is ownerless. Commercial banks are
regular stock companies that are owned by their stockholders. Fixed assets in panel (a) is buildings and investments in affiliated companies, and
Amortizable loans is loans with gradual repayment of the principal. Short-term assets is cash, cash equivalents, and securities held for trading, while
Overdraft facilities is trade credits and other fixed-limit loans. Building loans is fixed limit loans, and Other loans is every remaining loan type, such as
credit card debt and leasing contracts. Losses is allowances for losses on all loans. Equity in panel (b) is total non-debt funds for savings banks (including
the PCC capital for PCC banks) and total shareholder equity for commercial banks. Subordinated debt is debt that is considered capital for capital
requirement purposes, Due to customers is regular deposits, Due to banks is interbank loans including loans from the central bank, and Other liabilities is
securities issued. All figures are reported as a percentage of total assets and are value-weighted averages across banks and equally-weighted across years.
The sample is all Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial banks during the period 1985–2002.
(a): Assets
(b): Liabilities
Time period 1: Non-PCC 2: PCC 3: Com  1 - 2  2 - 3  1 - 3
1985–2002 0.88 0.41 0.32 0.47*** 0.09*** 0.57***
(4.19) (3.07) (9.51)
1988–1992 0.89 -0.46 -0.84 1.36*** 0.37 1.73***
(5.49) (0.65) (8.33)
1993–2002 1.00 0.85 0.91 0.15*** -0.06 0.09
(5.26) (-1.72) (0.98)
Mean ROA Difference
This table shows the mean return on assets (ROA) across the three bank types. ROA is net income
divided by total assets. The mean ROA per year is equally-weighted across firms, while the average
ROA over multiple years at the bottom of the table is equally-weighted across years. Non-PCC banks
are ownerless. PCC banks have issued equity securities to the general public in the form of Primary
Capital Certificates (PCC). The remaining equity in PCC banks is ownerless. Commercial banks are
regular stock companies that are owned by their stockholders. We report the mean ROA for each bank
type, the pairwise difference in means, and its t-value in parentheses. Statistically significant
differences at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are labeled *, **, and ***, respectively. The sample is all
Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial banks.
Table 4: Return on assets
Independent variable 1985–2002 1988–1992 1993–2002
PCC -0.181** -1.510*** -0.095*
(-2.27) (-4.63) (-1.70)
Com -0.765*** -2.741*** -0.119
(-5.61) (-6.84) (-0.96)
Asset risk 1.419*** 1.352* 1.321***
(5.27) (1.74) (5.89)
Liability risk 0.836*** 4.385*** -0.482***
(3.65) (6.33) (-2.71)
Bank size -0.063*** -0.219*** 0.053***
(-2.78) (-3.18) (2.95)
Adjusted R2, % 31.11 37.20 33.08
Wald chi2 1,110.67 450.40 736.30
Probability of chi2, % 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 2,660 738 1,362
This table relates a bank's economic performance to its hypothesized determinants as specified in the
leftmost column. Performance is measured as return on assets (ROA), which we operationalize as net
income divided by total assets at year end. PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank
is a PCC bank (Commercial bank) and 0 otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not
cash, claims on the central bank, amortizable loans, or fixed assets. Liability risk is the fraction of
total assets which is not deposits. We assume that the lower these two measures, the smaller the risk.
Bank size is the log of the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK. The model is estimated with fixed
time effects and random firm effects. We report the estimated regression coefficients and their t-
statistic (in parentheses). Statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are
labeled *, **, and ***, respectively. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, the Wald
chi2, the p-value of Wald chi2, and the number of observations. The sample is all Norwegian non-
PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial banks. Non-PCC banks are ownerless. PCC banks
have issued equity securities to the general public in the form of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC).
The remaining equity in PCC banks is ownerless. Commercial banks are regular stock companies that
are owned by their stockholders.
Table 5: Base-case performance regressions
Independent variable 1985–2002 1988–1992 1993–2002
PCC -0.220 -0.289* -0.145
(-1.18) (-1.84) (-0.84)
Com -0.652** -0.639*** -0.570***
(-2.57) (-3.75) (-3.06)
Asset risk 1.578 2.135* -3.106***
(1.25) (1.76) (-2.89)
Liability risk 0.927* 0.965 0.376
(1.80) (2.66) (0.97)
Bank size -0.032 -0.031 0.045
(-0.38) (-0.63) (0.87)
Adj. R2, % 28.27 16.79 30.27
Wald chi2 162.34 24.27 101.60
Prob. of chi2, % 0.00 0.39 0.00
n 473 145 229
This table re-estimates the base-case model from table 5 using size-matched samples. We
include only non-PCC banks that are larger than the smallest commercial bank, while ensuring
that the sample has at least as many non-PCC banks as commercial banks. Performance is
measured as return on assets (ROA), which we operationalize as net income divided by total
assets at year end. PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a PCC bank
(Commercial bank) and 0 otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets that is not cash, claims
on the central bank, amortizable loans, or fixed assets. Liability risk is the fraction of total
assets that is not deposits. We assume that the lower these two measures, the smaller the risk.
Bank size is the log of the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK. All regressions account for
time-varying industry effects and random firm effects. We report the estimated regression
coefficients and their t-statistics (in parentheses). Statistically significant relationships at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels are labeled *, **, and ***, respectively. The bottom section of the
table shows the adjusted R2, the Wald chi2 statistic, the p-value of Wald chi2, and the number
of observations. The sample is all Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed
commercial banks. Non-PCC banks are ownerless. PCC banks have issued equity securities to
the general public in the form of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). The remaining equity in
PCC banks is ownerless. Commercial banks are regular stock companies that are owned by
their stockholders.
Table 6: Size matching
Independent variable Return on equity Return on sales Return on equity Return on sales Return on equity Return on sales
PCC -11.516*** -2.640*** -1.510*** -11.217*** -0.974 -1.546*
(-3.14) (-3.96) (-4.63) (-4.83) (-1.57) (-1.95)
Com -28.526*** -5.915*** -2.741*** -18.471*** 1.713 -1.074
(-5.39) (-5.43) (-6.84) (-6.77) (1.29) (-0.60)
Asset risk -1.221 15.441*** -0.219*** 13.249** 1.793*** 18.380***
(-1.56) (6.82) (-3.18) (2.43) (9.50) (5.87)
Liability risk 29.160*** 4.362** 4.385*** 29.663*** -7.134*** -10.964***
(2.83) (2.29) (6.33) (6.14) (-3.55) (-4.33)
Size 15.109 -0.191 1.352 -1.699*** -3.013 1.096***
(1.22) (-1.08) (1.74) (-3.72) (-1.19) (4.26)
Adjusted R2 3.45 40.23 37.2 42.02 35.08 24.43
Wald chi2 94 1,749 450 548 630 460
Prob. of chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 2,652 2,660 738 738 1,362 1,362
Table 7: Alternative performance measures
1985–2002 1988–1992 1993–2002
This table re-estimates the base-case model from table 5 under two alternative performance measures specified at the top of each column. Return on equity
is net income divided by book equity, while Return on sales (Profit margin) is net income divided by revenues. Asset risk is measured as the fraction of
assets that is not cash, claims on the central bank, amortizable loans, or fixed assets. Liability risk is the fraction of total assets that is not deposits. We
assume that the larger these two measures, the higher the risk. Size is the log of the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK. The model is estimated with fixed
time effects and random firm effects. We report the estimated regression coefficients and their t-statistics (in parentheses). Statistically significant
relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are labeled *, **, and ***, respectively. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, the Wald chi2, 
the p-value of Wald chi2, and the number of observations. The sample is all Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial banks. Non-
PCC banks are ownerless. PCC banks have issued equity securities to the general public in the form of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). The remaining
equity in PCC banks is ownerless. Commercial banks are regular stock companies that are owned by their stockholders.
Year PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com
1989 3.0 0.0 30.0 23.3 37.7 29.7 13.3 28.5 14.0 16.6
1990 3.3 0.0 28.0 25.4 42.8 31.9 13.2 24.3 10.5 16.8
1991 2.5 3.7 30.5 26.6 48.3 20.0 11.2 35.0 5.2 12.9
1992 2.4 10.8 38.6 24.9 35.8 25.4 18.6 28.9 2.6 8.1
1993 12.0 17.3 37.4 22.3 25.4 25.4 18.8 23.6 4.2 9.3
1994 6.8 13.0 33.5 21.5 28.6 21.4 25.0 32.3 4.3 9.6
1995 5.2 12.3 43.9 21.1 16.9 21.3 29.2 24.8 2.8 18.3
1996 2.1 11.6 50.5 19.8 13.9 26.1 27.0 21.4 4.4 19.3
1997 2.6 11.6 52.6 19.0 13.4 25.9 25.5 22.8 3.9 18.9
1998 2.4 11.6 50.7 18.4 19.5 23.2 22.3 21.1 3.2 23.8
1999 2.0 16.7 55.2 22.2 15.3 23.5 20.9 22.5 4.3 13.8
2000 2.0 15.0 55.3 24.2 15.2 29.8 20.4 21.2 5.1 8.2
2001 2.0 12.4 54.0 24.0 15.4 30.2 19.5 21.0 6.8 10.4
2002 1.8 13.2 55.7 24.2 16.4 24.6 19.5 22.2 4.5 13.8
Average 2.9 9.8 48.7 22.4 20.0 25.7 21.3 25.3 5.0 14.9
PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com
1989 18.3 11.7 9.5 10.0 36.2 33.7 27.0 31.0
1990 9.8 14.8 9.5 13.0 31.3 34.8 31.0 32.0
1991 20.3 14.0 12.5 11.0 39.5 41.7 33.0 43.0
1992 10.0 22.1 11.0 17.5 29.2 47.5 33.0 43.0
1993 16.2 23.8 7.0 11.0 31.4 42.4 25.0 34.0
1994 11.0 19.9 6.5 11.5 26.8 39.6 23.5 32.0
1995 8.6 19.6 6.0 13.0 20.9 35.9 19.0 28.0
1996 6.1 18.6 4.5 10.0 15.7 37.1 13.0 32.0
1997 4.6 17.0 4.5 10.0 13.5 40.9 14.0 44.0
1998 4.8 16.2 5.0 10.0 15.4 37.0 15.0 39.0
1999 6.1 15.7 6.0 9.5 16.4 36.7 18.0 31.5
2000 7.0 16.6 7.0 10.0 17.1 38.4 17.0 28.0
2001 7.4 16.6 8.0 10.0 18.0 36.2 18.0 32.0
2002 7.4 16.6 8.0 10.0 19.0 37.0 19.0 28.0
Average 8.1 17.2 6.0 10.0 20.1 38.3 18.0 35.5
(b): Ownership concentration
(a): Owner types
Foreign
Table 8: Ownership structure
State Personal Financial Industrial
This table shows ownership characteristics of the PCC banks and the commercial banks in the sample. PCC
banks have issued equity securities to the general public in the form of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC).
The remaining equity is ownerless. Commercial banks are regular stock companies owned by their
stockholders. Panel (a) reports the mean ownership fraction per bank type across five owner types in PCC
banks (PCC) and commercial banks (Com). Panel (b) shows the mean and median ownership fraction for
the largest owner and for the five largest owners, respectively. We exclude observations where the largest
owner has 90% or more of the equity held by stockholders.
Five largest owners
Mean Median
Largest owner
Mean Median
1 2 3
Year  Non-PCC PCC Com  1 - 2  2 - 3  1 - 3 Max Min Max Min Max Min
1985 6.11 5.54 0.57 13.95 2.36 9.17 3.86
(1.28)
1986 5.82 6.12 -0.30 14.00 0.00 9.91 3.51
(-0.69)
1987 7.01 5.53 1.48*** 18.31 2.29 8.72 3.36
(3.45)
1988 6.82 5.78 5.01 1.04 0.77 1.81* 16.98 -1.62 7.18 4.67 7.93 -6.84
(1.34) (0.63) (1.83)
1989 7.41 5.43 4.86 1.97*** 0.57 2.54* 17.36 3.32 7.55 2.87 7.55 -11.55
(3.40) (0.41) (1.94)
1990 7.86 4.29 5.82 3.57** -1.53 2.04*** 17.50 1.03 7.50 -3.53 8.31 2.94
(2.48) (-1.02) (3.73)
1991 7.71 5.63 6.13 2.08*** -0.50 1.58** 17.97 -16.20 8.67 2.70 9.67 4.22
(2.86) (-0.61) (2.59)
1992 10.70 6.67 7.60 4.03*** -0.93 3.11*** 19.30 4.70 10.36 0.43 12.35 4.79
(4.05) (-0.80) (4.32)
1993 11.53 9.10 11.33 2.43*** -2.23 0.20 21.46 6.30 10.98 6.14 28.62 5.80
(3.62) (-1.07) (0.10)
1994 12.27 9.23 9.47 3.05*** -0.24 2.81*** 22.43 5.77 11.95 7.72 11.31 8.35
(6.15) (-0.50) (6.85)
1995 13.03 10.20 9.97 2.83*** 0.23 3.06*** 24.20 6.27 16.53 7.44 12.75 8.59
(3.81) (0.28) (5.08)
1996 13.23 10.91 8.78 2.31*** 2.13** 4.45*** 26.06 6.52 19.09 8.47 10.20 6.87
(2.86) (2.51) (7.84)
1997 12.93 10.90 8.86 2.03** 2.04** 4.07*** 26.40 7.29 19.04 7.55 10.07 6.78
(2.24) (2.16) (7.45)
1998 12.88 10.78 9.29 2.10*** 1.49* 3.59*** 25.96 7.22 18.23 5.51 10.90 6.54
(2.77) (1.72) (5.53)
1999 12.85 10.58 8.66 2.27*** 1.91* 4.18*** 26.88 8.31 17.70 6.72 10.63 6.65
(3.42) (1.88) (4.58)
2000 12.51 10.00 8.78 2.51*** 1.23 3.74*** 26.65 7.82 17.32 6.32 10.92 6.72
(4.27) (1.22) (3.92)
2001 11.98 9.65 8.12 2.33*** 1.52* 3.85*** 26.15 7.29 16.10 7.09 9.51 6.78
(4.53) (1.72) (4.53)
2002 11.49 9.16 7.74 2.33*** 1.42 3.74*** 26.75 6.90 15.92 5.25 8.78 6.70
(4.44) (1.27) (3.42)
Average 9.82 9.38 7.14 0.44*** 2.24 2.68*** 21.57 3.64 13.61 5.02 10.96 4.12
(3.48) (0.65) (3.76)
This table shows distributional characteristics of the capitalization ratio, which we measure as the book value
of equity plus subordinated loans divided by the book value of assets. We report the t-values in parentheses,
while statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are labeled *, **, and ***,
respectively. The sample is all Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial banks. Non-
PCC banks are ownerless. PCC banks have issued equity securities to the general public in the form of
Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). The remaining equity in PCC banks is ownerless. Commercial banks are
regular stock companies that are owned by their stockholders.
Table 9: The capitalization ratio across years and bank types
Difference in meanMean
Non-PCC PCC Com
Extreme values
All  1: Non-PCC 2: PCC 3: Com  1 - 2  2 - 3  1 - 3
Branch competition
Mean 0.53 0.55 0.38 0.35 0.17*** 0.02 0.20***
Median 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.32 (3.48) (0.57) (2.75)
Std 0.68 0.72 0.36 0.28
Min 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02
Max 5.43 5.43 2.92 1.19
Bank competition
Mean 1.48 1.51 1.30 1.04 0.21** 0.25*** 0.47***
Median 1.29 1.37 1.17 1.15 (2.02) (3.09) (3.09)
Std 0.68 1.51 0.73 0.55
Min 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.26
Max 10.87 10.87 6.09 2.61
n 2,209 1,897 211 101  
All  1: Non-PCC 2: PCC 3: Com
Branch competition
Low 34 % 34 % 26 % 38 %
Medium 33 % 30 % 61 % 30 %
High 33 % 36 % 13 % 33 %
Bank competition
Low 34 % 35 % 21 % 38 %  
Medium 33 % 29 % 61 % 53 %
High 33 % 36 % 18 % 9 %
n 2,209 1,897 211 101
This table shows how the value of two alternatives measures of product market competition vary across the 
three bank types in our sample. Branch competition is the number of bank branches owned by other banks.
Bank competition is the number of other unique banks. Both measures are computed per 10,000
inhabitants and averaged over the municipalities in which the bank is operating. We report the t-values of
the difference in means in parentheses, while statistically significant differences at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels are labeled *, **, and ***, respectively. The sample is all Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks,
and listed commercial banks. Non-PCC banks are ownerless. PCC banks have issued equity securities to
the general public in the form of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). The remaining equity in PCC banks
is ownerless. Commercial banks are regular stock companies that are owned by their stockholders.
Table 10: Product market competition across bank types
(b) Levels of competitive intensity
Bank type
(a) Distributional properties 
Bank type Difference
Independent variable
PCC -0.039 0.144 0.687 1.478** -0.105 -0.117
(-0.32) (0.87) (1.08) (2.09) (-1.56) (-1.31)
Com -0.001 0.283 -0.640 -0.262 -0.205 -0.161
(0.00) (0.83) (-1.40) (-0.46) (-1.23) (-0.76)
Asset risk 1.570*** 1.570*** 1.436** 1.441** 1.318*** 1.296***
(4.95) (4.91) (2.07) (2.01) (6.18) (6.04)
Liability risk 1.240*** 1.305*** 5.689*** 6.081*** -0.291 -0.290
(3.84) (4.05) (6.51) (6.89) (-1.49) (-1.48)
Bank size -0.081** -0.089** -0.273*** -0.269*** 0.043** 0.040**
(-2.27) (-2.47) (-4.31) (-4.16) (2.48) (2.32)
Branch competition 0.009 -0.008 0.017
(0.17) (-0.08) (0.62)
Branch competition * PCC -0.208 -6.107*** 0.019
(-1.14) (-3.92) (0.21)
Branch competition * Com -3.667*** -6.035*** 0.097
(-7.01) (-7.23) (0.27)
Bank competition 0.002 0.014 -0.003
(0.09) (0.29) (-0.20)
Bank competition * PCC -0.180* -2.498*** 0.016
(-1.91) (-4.69) (0.33)
Bank competition * Com -1.490*** -2.477*** -0.003
(-5.78) (-5.82) (-0.02)
Adjusted R2, % 32.49 32.59 44.79 43.96 34.70 34.55
Wald chi2 1,098.14 1,078.09 600.55 579.32 777.74 777.58
Probability of chi2, % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 2,209 2,209 717 717 1,348 1,348
This table relates a bank's economic performance to its hypothesized determinants as specified in the leftmost
column. Performance is measured as return on assets (ROA), which we operationalize as net income divided by
total assets at year end. PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a PCC bank (Commercial
bank) and 0 otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets that is not cash, claims on the central bank,
amortizable loans, or fixed assets. Liability risk is the fraction of total assets that is not deposits. We assume
that the lower these two measures, the smaller the risk. Bank size is the log of the bank's assets in constant 2002
NOK. Branch competition is the number branches owned by other banks. Bank competition is the number of
unique banks per inhabitant. Both measures are averaged over the municipalities in which the bank is
operating, the weight being the fraction of the bank’s total assets invested in that municipality. The model is
estimated with fixed time effects and random firm effects. We report the estimated regression coefficients and
their t-statistics (in parentheses). Statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are
labeled *, **, and ***, respectively. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, the Wald chi2, the p-
value of Wald chi2, and the number of observations. The sample is all Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks,
and listed commercial banks. Non-PCC banks are ownerless. PCC banks have issued equity securities to the
general public in the form of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). The remaining equity in PCC banks is
ownerless. Commercial banks are regular stock companies that are owned by their stockholders.
Table 11: Product market competition
1985–2002 1988–1992 1993–2002
